

2017Fall:Software Security

Lecture 5 : Practical Control Flow Hijack Defense: StackGuard, DEP, and ASLR

Bing Mao

maobing@nju.edu.cn

Department of Computer Science



Outline

Background

- Control Flow Hijack
- Control Flow Hijack Defense
- Canary Defense
- StackGuard
- StackGuard Weakness
- DiffGuard
- Polymorphic Canary

Data Execution Prevention

- Definition
- DEP Scorecard
- Return-to-libc Attack

ASLR

- ASLR Randomization
- ASLR

Software Security

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Occurs when an attacker **gains** control of

the instruction pointer


A few common hijack methods

- 1 buffer overflows
- 2 heap overflow
- 3 format string attacks

Credit: a portion of the slides in this lecture are compiled from Dr. David Brumley and also from book CSAPP

Background

Control Flow Hijack



- 1 Leveraging memory corruption **vulnerabilities**
- 2 Crafting special input (**exploit**):
 - Performing certain **computation**
 - Gaining the **control** of the program

Same principle, different mechanism

- 1 Code injection
- 2 Return-to-libc
- 3 Return-oriented programming (ROP)

Background

Control Flow Hijack Defense

Vulnerabilities (bugs) are the root cause of hijacks

- 1 Identify vulnerabilities with analysis tools (before attackers)
- 2 Prove program correctness

Mitigation Techniques:

- 1 Canaries – StackGuard
- 2 Data Execution Prevention (DEP) /No eXecute (NX)
- 3 Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)

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Control Flow Hijack Defense

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Background

Control Flow Hijack Defense

Proposed defense scorecard:

Aspect	Defense
Performance	Smaller impact is better
Deployment	Can everyone easiliy use it
Compatibility	Does not break libraries
Safety Guarantee	Completely secure to easy to bypass

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Canary-Based Protection

Canary Defense

Wikipedia: “the historic practice of using canaries in coal mines, since they would be affected by toxic gases earlier than the miners, thus providing a biological warning system.”

Canary / Stack Cookies



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Canary Defense

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Canary-Based Protection


Canary Defense

"A"x68 . " \xEF \xBE \xAD\xDE"

```
#include<string.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    char buf[64];
    strcpy(buf, argv[1]);
}
```

Dump of assembler code for function main:

```
0x080483e4 <+0>: push    %ebp
0x080483e5 <+1>: mov     %esp,%ebp
0x080483e7 <+3>: sub    $72,%esp
0x080483ea <+6>: mov    12(%ebp),%eax
0x080483ed <+9>: mov    4(%eax),%eax
0x080483f0 <+12>: mov   %eax,4(%esp)
0x080483f4 <+16>: lea   -64(%ebp),%eax
0x080483f7 <+19>: mov   %eax,(%esp)
0x080483fa <+22>: call  0x8048300 <strcpy@plt>
0x080483ff <+27>: leave
0x08048400 <+28>: ret
```



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Canary-Based Protection


Canary Defense

"A"x68 . "\xEF\xBE\xAD\xDE"

```
#include<string.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    char buf[64];
    strcpy(buf, argv[1]);
}
```

Dump of assembler code for function main:

```
0x080483e4 <+0>: push %ebp
0x080483e5 <+1>: mov %esp,%ebp
0x080483e7 <+3>: sub $72,%esp
0x080483ea <+6>: mov 12(%ebp),%eax
0x080483ed <+9>: mov 4(%eax),%eax
0x080483f0 <+12>: mov %eax,4(%esp)
0x080483f4 <+16>: lea -64(%ebp),%eax
0x080483f7 <+19>: mov %eax,(%esp)
0x080483fa <+22>: call 0x8048300 <strcpy@plt>
0x080483ff <+27>: leave
0x08048400 <+28>: ret
```



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ASLR


- ASLR Randomization
- ASLR

Canary-Based Protection

StackGuard

Idea:

- prologue introduces a **canary word** between return addr and locals



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
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Canary-Based Protection

StackGuard

Idea:

- prologue introduces a **canary word** between return addr and locals
- epilogue checks canary before function returns



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
ASLR Randomization
ASLR



Idea:

- prologue introduces a **canary word** between return addr and locals
- epilogue checks canary before function returns

Wrong Canary => Overflow



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Canary-Based Protection


StackGuard

gcc Stack-Smashing Protector

Dump of assembler code for function main:

```
0x08048440 <+0>: push  %ebp
0x08048441 <+1>: mov   %esp,%ebp
0x08048443 <+3>: sub   $76,%esp
0x08048446 <+6>: mov   %gs:20,%eax
0x0804844c <+12>: mov   %eax,-4(%ebp)
0x0804844f <+15>: xor   %eax,%eax
0x08048451 <+17>: mov   12(%ebp),%eax
0x08048454 <+20>: mov   4(%eax),%eax
0x08048457 <+23>: mov   %eax,4(%esp)
0x0804845b <+27>: lea  -68(%ebp),%eax
0x0804845e <+30>: mov   %eax,(%esp)
0x08048461 <+33>: call 0x8048350 <strcpy@plt>
0x08048466 <+38>: mov   -4(%ebp),%edx
0x08048469 <+41>: xor   %gs:20,%edx
0x08048470 <+48>: je    0x8048477 <main+55>
0x08048472 <+50>: call 0x8048340 <__stack_chk_fail@plt>
0x08048477 <+55>: leave
0x08048478 <+56>: ret
```

Compiled with v4.6.1:
gcc -fstack-protector -O1 ...



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
Canary-Based Protection

StackGuard



Setting up canary

Before call to gets



```
/* Echo Line */
void echo()
{
    char buf[4]; /* Way too small! */
    gets(buf);
    puts(buf);
}
```

```
echo:
    . . .
    movl    %gs:20, %eax    # Get canary
    movl    %eax, -8(%ebp)  # Put on stack
    xorl    %eax, %eax     # Erase canary
    . . .
```

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Canary-Based Protection

StackGuard

Checking canary

Before call to gets



```
/* Echo Line */  
void echo()  
{  
    char buf[4]; /* Way too small! */  
    gets(buf);  
    puts(buf);  
}
```

← %ebp

buf

```
echo:  
    . . .  
    movl    -8(%ebp), %eax    # Retrieve from stack  
    xorl    %gs:20, %eax     # Compare with Canary  
    je     .L24              # Same: skip ahead  
    call   __stack_chk_fail # ERROR  
.L24:  
    . . .
```

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ASLR


- ASLR Randomization
- ASLR

Canary-Based Protection


StackGuard

Canary example

Before call to gets



Input 1234



```
(gdb) break echo
(gdb) run
(gdb) stepi 3
(gdb) print /x *((unsigned *) $ebp - 2)
$1 = 0x3e37d00
```

Benign corruption!
(allows programmers to make
silent off-by-one errors)

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Canary-Based Protection

StackGuard

Glibc

- Generate random canary
- Exception handling function

```
#0 security_init () at rtld.c:854
// 相当于glibc/dynamic-linker的main
#1 dl_main () at rtld.c:1818
#2 _dl_sysdep_start () at ../elf/dl-sysdep.c:249
#3 _dl_start_final () at rtld.c:331
#4 _dl_start () at rtld.c:557
// glibc/dynamic-linker入口
#5 _start () from /lib/ld-linux.so.2
```



调用栈

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StackGuard

```
static void security_init (void)
{
    ...
    /* Set up the stack checker's canary. */
    uintptr_t stack_chk_guard = _dl_setup_stack_chk_guard (_dl_random);
    #ifdef THREAD_SET_STACK_GUARD
    THREAD_SET_STACK_GUARD (stack_chk_guard);
    ...
}
```

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Canary-Based Protection

StackGuard

```
static inline uintptr_t __attribute__((always_inline)) _dl_setup_stack_chk_guard (void){
    uintptr_t ret;
    #ifdef ENABLE_STACKGUARD_RANDOMIZE
    int fd = __open ("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
    if (fd >= 0) {
        ssize_t reslen = __read (fd, &ret, sizeof (ret));
        __close (fd);
        if (reslen == (ssize_t) sizeof (ret))
            return ret;
    }
    #endif
    ret = 0;
    unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) &ret;
    p[sizeof (ret) - 1] = 255;
    p[sizeof (ret) - 2] = '\n';
    return ret;
}
```

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Canary-Based Protection

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Glibc

- Generate random canary
- Exception handling function

[glibc-2.19/debug/stack_chk_fail.c](#)

```
#line 24
void
__attribute__((noreturn))
__stack_chk_fail (void)
{
    __fortify_fail ("stack smashing detected");
}
```

```
zwp@ubuntu:~/Desktop$ ./demo b.txt
Welcome to seclab!
*** stack smashing detected ***: ./demo terminated
```

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Canary Should be HARD to Forge:

Random Canary

- ▶ 4 random bytes chosen at load time
- ▶ stored in a guarded page
- ▶ need good randomness

Random XOR canaries



Canary scorecard

Aspect	Defense
Performance	Several instructions per function Time: a few percentange on average Size: can optimize away in safe functions
Deployment	Recompile sufficies; no code change
Compatibility	Perfect – invisible to outside
Safety Guarantee	Not really ...

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
Canary-Based Protection

StackGuard Weakness

Bypass: Data Pointer Subterfuge

Overwrite a data pointer *first*...

```
int *ptr;  
char buf[64];  
memcpy(buf, user1);  
*ptr = user2;
```



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Check does ***not*** happen until epilogue...

- func ptr subterfuge
- C++ vtable hijack
- exception handler hijack
- ...

Canary-Based Protection

StackGuard Weakness

Check does ***not*** happen until epilogue...

- func ptr subterfuge } PointGuard
- C++ vtable hijack
- exception handler hijack } SafeSEH
SEHOP
- ...

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
ASLR Randomization
ASLR

Hacking Blind

- ▶ The situation is common in C/S mode, that the server forks a child process to service for client and the service restarts after a crash.
- ▶ All the children processes inherit/share the same memory layout from the parent process.
- ▶ The attacker can try in bounded time all the possible values of canary(for SSP) and memory layout(for ASLR) until the correct ones are found.

Canary-Based Protection

DiffGuard



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A straight method is to update the canary when the parent server forks the child process.

Any question?

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
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Canary-Based Protection

DiffGuard

DiffGuard-普通程序



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
- ASLR Randomization
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Canary-Based Protection

DiffGuard

DiffGuard-Forking Program



(c)当fork函数调用时，更新rcb中canary的值

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
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Canary-Based Protection

DiffGuard

DiffGuard-Forking Program



(d)父进程与子进程拥有各自的rcb，在函数调用结束时，校验 canary是否被篡改

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
- ASLR Randomization
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Canary-Based Protection

Polymorphic Canary



(a) Initialization of the canary in the TLS.

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Data Execution Prevention


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Canary-Based Protection

Polymorphic Canary



(b) Loading of Canary in function prologue.

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Data Execution Prevention


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Polymorphic Canary



(c) Verification of canary in function epilogue.

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Data Execution Prevention


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Canary-Based Protection

Polymorphic Canary



(d) The forked (child) process is a copy of the parent.

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

ASLR

- ASLR Randomization
- ASLR



Canary-Based Protection

Polymorphic Canary

Parent Process



Child Process



(a) Updating of canary in the child process.

Software Security

Background

- Control Flow Hijack
- Control Flow Hijack Defense
- Canary Defense
- StackGuard
- StackGuard Weakness
- DiffGuard

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Polymorphic Canary

Data Execution Prevention

- Definition
- DEP Scorecard
- Return-to-libc Attack

ASLR


- ASLR Randomization
- ASLR

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Dept. of Computer Science,
Nanjing University

Canary-Based Protection

Polymorphic Canary



(b) Loading of canary in stack frame generated by child-process.

Background

- Control Flow Hijack
- Control Flow Hijack Defense
- Canary Defense
- StackGuard
- StackGuard Weakness
- DiffGuard

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Polymorphic Canary

Data Execution Prevention


- Definition
- DEP Scorecard
- Return-to-libc Attack

ASLR

- ASLR Randomization
- ASLR

Canary-Based Protection

Polymorphic Canary



(c) Verification of canary in child-process's stack frame.

Background

- Control Flow Hijack
- Control Flow Hijack Defense
- Canary Defense
- StackGuard
- StackGuard Weakness
- DiffGuard

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Polymorphic Canary

Data Execution Prevention


- Definition
- DEP Scorecard
- Return-to-libc Attack

ASLR

- ASLR Randomization
- ASLR

Canary-Based Protection

Polymorphic Canary



(d) Verification of canary when execution reaches frames inherited from the parent.

Background

- Control Flow Hijack
- Control Flow Hijack Defense
- Canary Defense
- StackGuard
- StackGuard Weakness
- DiffGuard

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Polymorphic Canary

Data Execution Prevention

- Definition
- DEP Scorecard
- Return-to-libc Attack

ASLR

- ASLR Randomization
- ASLR

Canary-Based Protection

Polymorphic Canary

```
;function prologue
55          push  %rbp
48 89 e5    mov    %rsp,%rbp
48 83 ec 10 sub    $0x10,%rsp
64 48 8b 04 25 a8 02 mov    %fs:0x2a8,%rax
00 00
48 89 45 f8 mov    %rax,-0x8(%rbp)
64 48 8b 04 25 b0 02 mov    %fs:0x2b0,%rax
00 00
48 89 45 f0 mov    %rax,-0x10(%rbp)

.....

;canary check
48 8b 55 f8 mov    -0x8(%rbp),%rdx
48 8b 7d f0 mov    -0x10(%rbp),%rdx
48 31 fa    xor    %rdi,%rdx
64 48 33 14 25 a0 02 xor    %fs:0x2a0,%rdx
00 00
74 09      je     Label
e8 80 fd ff ff callq <__stack_chk_fail@plt>
Label:
c9        leaveq
c3        retq
```

Background


- Control Flow Hijack
- Control Flow Hijack Defense
- Canary Defense
- StackGuard
- StackGuard Weakness
- DiffGuard
- Polymorphic Canary
- Data Execution Prevention
- Definition
- DEP Scorecard
- Return-to-libc Attack

ASLR

- ASLR Randomization
- ASLR

Data Execution Prevention

How to defeat exploits



Software Security

Background

- Control Flow Hijack
- Control Flow Hijack Defense
- Canary Defense
- StackGuard
- StackGuard Weakness
- DiffGuard
- Polymorphic Canary

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Data Execution Prevention


- Definition
- DEP Scorecard
- Return-to-libc Attack

ASLR

- ASLR Randomization
- ASLR

Data Execution Prevention

How to defeat exploits



Software Security

Background

- Control Flow Hijack
- Control Flow Hijack Defense
- Canary Defense
- StackGuard
- StackGuard Weakness
- DiffGuard
- Polymorphic Canary

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Data Execution Prevention


- Definition
- DEP Scorecard
- Return-to-libc Attack

ASLR

- ASLR Randomization
- ASLR

Data Execution Prevention

How to defeat exploits



- Control Flow Hijack
- Control Flow Hijack Defense
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- Definition
- DEP Scorecard
- Return-to-libc Attack

- ASLR Randomization
- ASLR

Data Execution Prevention

Definition



Mark stack as
non-executable
using NX bit

Software Security

Background

- Control Flow Hijack
- Control Flow Hijack Defense
- Canary Defense
- StackGuard
- StackGuard Weakness
- DiffGuard
- Polymorphic Canary

Data Execution Prevention

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Definition

- DEP Scorecard
- Return-to-libc Attack

ASLR

- ASLR Randomization
- ASLR

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Data Execution Prevention

Definition



CRASH

Mark stack as
non-executable
using NX bit

Software Security

Background

- Control Flow Hijack
- Control Flow Hijack Defense
- Canary Defense
- StackGuard
- StackGuard Weakness
- DiffGuard
- Polymorphic Canary

Data Execution Prevention

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Definition

- DEP Scorecard
- Return-to-libc Attack

ASLR

- ASLR Randomization
- ASLR

Data Execution Prevention

Definition



CRASH

Mark stack as
non-executable
using NX bit

(still a Denial-of-Service attack!)

- Control Flow Hijack
- Control Flow Hijack Defense
- Canary Defense
- StackGuard
- StackGuard Weakness
- DiffGuard
- Polymorphic Canary

- DEP Scorecard
- Return-to-libc Attack

- ASLR Randomization
- ASLR

Data Execution Prevention

Definition

W ^ X



Each memory page is *exclusively* either writable *or* executable.

(still a Denial-of-Service attack!)

Background

- Control Flow Hijack
- Control Flow Hijack Defense
- Canary Defense
- StackGuard
- StackGuard Weakness
- DiffGuard
- Polymorphic Canary

Data Execution Prevention

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Definition

- DEP Scorecard
- Return-to-libc Attack

ASLR

- ASLR Randomization
- ASLR

Data Execution Prevention


Definition

"A"x68 . "\xEF\xBE\xAD\xDE"(cannot be executed)

```
#include<string.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    char buf[64];
    strcpy(buf, argv[1]);
}
```

Dump of assembler code for function main:

```
0x080483e4 <+0>: push    %ebp
0x080483e5 <+1>: mov     %esp,%ebp
0x080483e7 <+3>: sub    $72,%esp
0x080483ea <+6>: mov    12(%ebp),%eax
0x080483ed <+9>: mov    4(%eax),%eax
0x080483f0 <+12>: mov    %eax,4(%esp)
0x080483f4 <+16>: lea   -64(%ebp),%eax
0x080483f7 <+19>: mov    %eax,(%esp)
0x080483fa <+22>: call  0x8048300 <strcpy@plt>
0x080483ff <+27>: leave
0x08048400 <+28>: ret
```



Background

- Control Flow Hijack
- Control Flow Hijack Defense
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- StackGuard
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Data Execution Prevention

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- Definition
- DEP Scorecard
- Return-to-libc Attack

ASLR

- ASLR Randomization
- ASLR

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Data Execution Prevention

DEP Scorecard

DEP scorecard

Aspect	DEP
Performance	With hardware support: no impact Otherwise: reported to be <1% in PaX
Deployment	Kernel support (common on all platforms) Modules opt-in (less frequent in Windows)
Compatibility	Can break legitimate programs JIT compilers; unpackers
Safety Guarantee	Code injected to NX pages never executed But code injection may not be necessary ...

Software Security

Background

Control Flow Hijack

Control Flow Hijack
Defense

Canary Defense

StackGuard

StackGuard Weakness

DiffGuard

Polymorphic Canary

Data Execution
Prevention

Definition

DEP Scorecard

Return-to-libc Attack

ASLR

ASLR Randomization

ASLR

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
Data Execution Prevention

Return-to-libc Attack

Overwrite return address by address of a libc function

- setup fake return address and argument(s)
- ret will “call” libc function

No injected code!



Software Security

Background

Control Flow Hijack
Control Flow Hijack Defense
Canary Defense
StackGuard
StackGuard Weakness
DiffGuard
Polymorphic Canary

Data Execution Prevention

Definition
DEP Scorecard
Return-to-libc Attack


ASLR

ASLR Randomization
ASLR

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ASLR



Background

- Control Flow Hijack
- Control Flow Hijack Defense
- Canary Defense
- StackGuard
- StackGuard Weakness
- DiffGuard
- Polymorphic Canary

Data Execution Prevention

- Definition
- DEP Scorecard
- Return-to-libc Attack


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ASLR

- ASLR Randomization
- ASLR

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ASLR



Background

- Control Flow Hijack
- Control Flow Hijack Defense
- Canary Defense
- StackGuard
- StackGuard Weakness
- DiffGuard
- Polymorphic Canary


Data Execution Prevention

- Definition
- DEP Scorecard
- Return-to-libc Attack

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- ASLR Randomization
- ASLR

ASLR



Background

- Control Flow Hijack
- Control Flow Hijack Defense
- Canary Defense
- StackGuard
- StackGuard Weakness
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- Polymorphic Canary

Data Execution Prevention

- Definition
- DEP Scorecard
- Return-to-libc Attack

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ASLR

- ASLR Randomization
- ASLR

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Traditional exploits need precise address

- ▶ Stack-based overflows: location of shellcode
- ▶ Return-to-libc: library address
- ▶ Program: program's memory layout is fixed
 - ▶ stack, heap, libraries, etc
- ▶ Solution: randomize address of each region

Background

Control Flow Hijack
Control Flow Hijack
Defense
Canary Defense
StackGuard
StackGuard Weakness
DiffGuard
Polymorphic Canary

Data Execution
Prevention

Definition
DEP Scorecard
Return-to-libc Attack

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ASLR

ASLR Randomization
ASLR

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Running cat twice

- Run 1

```
exploit:~# cat /proc/self/maps | egrep '(libc|heap|stack)'  
082ac000-082cd000 :rw-p 082ac000 00:00 0 [heap]  
b7dfe000-b7f53000 :r-xp 00000000 08:01 1750463 /lib/i686/cmov/libc-2.7.so  
b7f53000-b7f54000 :r--p 00155000 08:01 1750463 /lib/i686/cmov/libc-2.7.so  
b7f54000-b7f56000 :rw-p 00156000 08:01 1750463 /lib/i686/cmov/libc-2.7.so  
bf966000-bf97b000 :rw-p bffeb000 00:00 0 [stack]
```

- Run 2

```
exploit:~# cat /proc/self/maps | egrep '(libc|heap|stack)'  
086e8000-08709000 :rw-p 086e8000 00:00 0 [heap]  
b7d9a000-b7eef000 :r-xp 00000000 08:01 1750463 /lib/i686/cmov/libc-2.7.so  
b7eef000-b7ef0000 :r--p 00155000 08:01 1750463 /lib/i686/cmov/libc-2.7.so  
b7ef0000-b7ef2000 :rw-p 00156000 08:01 1750463 /lib/i686/cmov/libc-2.7.so  
bf902000-bf917000 :rw-p bffeb000 00:00 0 [stack]
```

Background

- Control Flow Hijack
- Control Flow Hijack Defense
- Canary Defense
- StackGuard
- StackGuard Weakness
- DiffGuard
- Polymorphic Canary

Data Execution Prevention

- Definition
- DEP Scorecard
- Return-to-libc Attack

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
ASLR

- ASLR Randomization
- ASLR

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ASLR

ASLR Randomization



Background

- Control Flow Hijack
- Control Flow Hijack Defense
- Canary Defense
- StackGuard
- StackGuard Weakness
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- Polymorphic Canary

Data Execution Prevention

- Definition
- DEP Scorecard
- Return-to-libc Attack

ASLR

- ASLR Randomization
- ASLR

ASLR scorecard

Aspect	ASLR
Performance	Excellent — randomize once at load time
Deployment	Turn on kernel support No recompilation necessary
Compatibility	Transparent to safe apps (Position independent)
Safety Guarantee	Not good on x32, much better on x64 But code injection may not be necessary ...

Background

- Control Flow Hijack
- Control Flow Hijack Defense
- Canary Defense
- StackGuard
- StackGuard Weakness
- DiffGuard
- Polymorphic Canary

Data Execution Prevention

- Definition
- DEP Scorecard
- Return-to-libc Attack

ASLR

- ASLR Randomization
- ASLR